ABSTRACT Multiple servers collaboration technology furnishes an effective storage management platform to the service providers. The massive data, which belong to disparate providers, possesses distinct access policies for each user. Authentication applied to multiple servers architecture is recognized as a remarkable mechanism for access control and authorization of users. In 2017, Jangirala et al. explored problems existing in the current research of authentication for multiple servers environment and presented a new solution. Nevertheless, we find that it is defenseless in impersonation attack, server spoofing attack, and fails to maintain users' anonymity. In this paper, we detail the aforementioned faults and propose a remedy with a tripartite certification strategy. Correspondingly, the validation of BAN-logic focused on tripartite authentication protocol is put forward to demonstrate the security reliability. Comparative evaluation of other related solutions for the multiple servers architecture observes that our proposal has advantages over security attributes meanwhile provides a reliable guarantee of efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence and vigorous development of the cloud computing unprecedentedly change the pattern of the traditional network information services. An increasing number of enterprises have encapsulated the data and services into the clouds, instead of sustaining the infrastructures of local database servers. It significantly facilitates the development of enterprises, which concentrate on their core services with cloud solutions. The cloud computing is the next paradigm for computing and profoundly effects everyone, however at the meantime it also brings about a series of privacy and security concerns. Each service provider stores the massive amounts of data in the cloud, which is draw up a unique access policy for users [1] , [2] . Analogously, each user may obtain network resources belonging to multiple service providers on the cloud computing platform, the tautological registration problems from which have been unfolded incrementally. Thereby, it has become an irresistible trend to formulate a unified authentication frame for such a. Multiple servers authentication mechanism enables users to access network services
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Nafees Mansoor. located on distributed servers with single registration and it is a feasible solution to solve the aforementioned issue [7] .
In the initialization of the multiple servers authentication system, the registration center is in charge of producing private keys for servers and users with the created primary secret key. After that, servers and users get their respective private keys to complete the authentication and key agreement protocol. Servers expect that the network services are accessed by authorized users, and the legitimate users want to enjoy convenient services with privacy protections [9] , [10] . Note that, the centralized registration tactic enables that servers and users register once, and then users can log in each server with same userid/password [8] .
The authentication mode in such a multiple servers system can be basically divided into two different types: two-party authentication mode [13] , [14] , [16] - [21] and three-party authentication mode [10] - [12] , [15] , [22] - [25] . As the name suggests, the former is only implemented by users and servers. The latter one permits the registration center to take part in each round of authentication to verify the validity of the other two participants. Concretely, users have to store all the secret keys associated with each server in the portable device for realizing mutual authentication in the two-party authentication mode. The storage capacity for private keys of clients is added linearly as the number of servers increases. The three-party authentication mode sacrifices the computing efficiency in exchange for better storage capacity of users. This mode increases calculation quantity of the registration center which owns an enormous computing resources, rather than the users' portable devices with limited processing power. Obviously, the latter mode would be more applicable to wireless mobile environment. However, it's important to point out that the registration center is incapable of acquiring the shared session key between users and servers in either authentication mode.
In the recent paper, Jangirala et al. [28] analyzed Shunmuganathan et al.'s [26] multi-server authentication protocol and proposed a new scheme with the two-party authentication mode. Although Jangirala et al.'s scheme enhanced the efficiency of the previously proposed schemes, we find that their scheme is exposed to impersonation attack, server spoofing attack and privacy disclosure. Therefore, we devise a modified authentication scheme for multiple servers architecture with three-party authentication mode to address the identified shortcomings. We further present the formal security analysis based on BAN-logic to demonstrate our scheme achieving complete triple authentication. The performance evaluation shows that the improved scheme is superior than the predecessor protocol in the security properties, meanwhile maintains an acceptable execution efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The review and security analysis of Jangirala et al.'s scheme are presented in Section 2 and 3, respectively. In Section 4, we detail the proposed solution for multiple servers architecture. The rigorous validation based on BAN-logic and the informal security analysis are provided in Section 5. Subsequently, the performance comparison with related protocols is illustrated in Section 6. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
Herein, we define notations in Table 1 used in the whole article. 
II. REVIEW OF JANGIRALA ET AL.'S SCHEME
Four main phases in Jangirala et al.'s scheme are registration phase, login phase, authentication and key agreement phase, password change phase. In Fig 3, we further illustrate their scheme except the preprocessed registration phase and separate executed password change phase.
Initially, the registration center RC chooses its primary secret key x and random number y to compute H (x y) and H (y). After that, shares them with service providing servers S j via a secure communication channel. Both x and y should be hold for safekeeping by RC.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
Step 1: U i chooses a random number b and creates A i = H (ID i ⊕ b ⊕ PW i ) with the username ID i and the corresponding password PW i . Then, he/she register in the registration center RC with {ID i , A i }, which includes U i 's hidden credential.
Step 2: RC receives U i 's registration request securely and
. And then, RC issues a smart card for U i , which is stored with the computed
Step 3: U i receives the issued smart card and keys 
B. LOGIN PHASE
Step 1: U i places the smart card into the terminal and is requested to input his/her legitimate username ID i and password PW i .
Step 2: The smart card employs ID i and
Then, it checks whether C * i equals to the stored C i to verify the validity of the inputted username and password. If C i = C * i , the smart card terminates the login phase and indicates that the username and password do not match.
Step 3: U i keys in the identity SID j of the target server S j , and then the smart card generates a random number N i to calculate
Step 4: Finally, the smart card submits the login request
C. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
Step 1: S j obtains the login request
Step 
Subsequently, the replied message {M 3 , M 4 } is sent to U i for approving the permission.
Step 3: U i needs to confirm that the permission messages 
D. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
Step 1: If U i wish to change password, the smart card force him/her to key ID i , PW i by means of a security policy.
Step 2:
, and checks whether C * i equals to C i . If C * i = C i , the smart card proceeds to execute this phase and enables users to enter a new password PW new i .
Step 3: After that, the smart card computes
). Finally, it replaces C i and L i with recalculated one and realizes the password update.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF JANGIRALA ET AL.'S SCHEME
In this section, we demonstrate that Jangirala et al.'s scheme [28] is susceptible to impersonation attack, server spoofing attack and user privacy disclosure. As mentioned before, it is essential that user stores all the secret keys associated with each server in the the two-party authentication mode. In their scheme, user applies for accessing the different servers with the invariable secret value. This is the main ingredient which results all the vulnerabilities. The details of these flaws are described as follows.
A. USER PRIVACY DISCLOSURE
Any adversary A could extract the value H (y) from the smart card and eavesdrop the login request message
The value E i is structurally constant and is a specific number associated with U i 's username ID i . It is deemed to be a recognition number for U i to login servers. A could track the history access records of the victim user and steal his/her privacy information. As a result, the above attack is effective and practical.
B. IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
Resistance to impersonation attack is the fundamental security property for authentication schemes. If any adversary A could impersonate other legal users to access servers, it doesn't make sense to implement access control and authorization. In the following, we examine this attack in detail.
Firstly, the adversary extracts values H (y) and D i from U i 's smart card by side-channel attack [3] , [4] . Afterwards, A transmits the previously U i 's login request
, which is intercepted in the public communication channel to S j . It is worth noting that the previous login request is valid although it is overdue. Once the login request is received, the target server S j will reply message {M 3 , M 4 } for approving the permission. Secondly, the adversary computes
Then the adversary transmits M 5 to S j . It's easy to see that the adversary successfully impersonates as U i to deceive the service providing server through the above operation.
C. SERVER SPOOFING ATTACK
Phishing is a common server spoofing attack, which compromises the accounts of online banking customers as well as other personal information. Therefore, defence such an attack is fateful for the security of authentication protocols. In the following, we prove that Jangirala et al.'s scheme suffers from server spoofing attack.
Let S k be a malicious server which possesses secret keys H (y) and H (x y). These values are identical for all servers administered by RC. After intercepting the login request mes-
where N j is a randomly selected number. Afterwards, sends the forged reply message {M 3 , M 4 } to U i . Obviously, the response message is correct and could pass the validation.
IV. OUR SCHEME
In this section, we present an enhanced protocol for multiple servers architecture with a three-party authentication mode, which can remedy the identified security flaws. In the proposed protocol, the private keys size of users and servers are both O (1) . The registration center undertakes a portion of verification tasks of service providing servers and users for trade off between efficiency and security. Our proposal includes five phases which are consistent with the original scheme except the server registration phase. In Fig 4, we depict the main phases including login phase and authentication & key agreement phase.
In the initialization of multiple servers authentication system, the registration center RC firstly chooses a large prime p and generates an elliptic curve group with generator P of order p [5] . Subsequently, RC continues to select a random number x ∈ Z p as the primary secret key, the public key is Q = x · P mod p.
A. SERVER REGISTRATION PHASE
Our proposed multiple servers authentication system is extensible and flexible, that is, servers can apply for registration in RC for providing services at any time rather than merely in the initialization of the system. It is superior over the multiple servers system based on two-party authentication mode.
Step 1: S j transmits the selected identity SID j to RC in plaintext format via an authenticated communication channel.
Step 2: RC receives the identity SID j and computes s j = H (SID j x) for S j . Then, RC sends the authorization value s j to S j .
Step 3: On receiving s j , S j officially becomes a legitimate service providing server.
B. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
The expandability of the proposed protocol is facilitated not just for servers registration but for the users registration as VOLUME 7, 2019 well. Users also register in RC at anytime by performing the following operations.
Step 1: U i chooses number r ∈ Z p randomly and registers in RC with username ID i , RPW i = H (PW i r) where include the selected password PW i implicitly. {ID i , RPW i } is finally transmitted to RC over an authenticated communication channel.
Step 2: RC receives U i 's registration request and computes
Step 3: Upon receiving these secret values, U i keys them with r into his/her portable device, such as mobile phones or PDAs. Obviously, the secret key size of user U i is constant.
C. LOGIN PHASE
Step 1: U i enters username ID i and password PW i into the portable device for confirming their correctness locally. Then the portable device computes
and verifies whether B * i = B i or not. If the equation holds, proceeds to Step 2; otherwise, it prompts that the typed username and password is incorrect and re-entered them. Noticeably, three consecutive wrong attempts will trigger locking mechanism about ten minutes.
Step 2: After the correctness validation of the entered ID i and PW i , the portable device proceeds to compute X = α ×P,
, where α ∈ Z p is a generated random number. Finally, U i sends the login request message {CID i , X } to the target server S j .
D. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
Step 1: S j receives the login request and generates a random integer number β ∈ Z p to calculate
Afterwards, S j transmits the message {SID j , V j } to RC, which encapsulates U i 's request with its secret key.
Step 2: RC receives the message {SID j , V j } and computes s j = H (SID j x) to decapsulate M j , CID i , X , Y from V j . Subsequently, RC is commissioned to ensure the legitimacy of S j with verifying the consistence of the computed H (X Y s j SID j ) and the decrypted M j . If the verification fails, RC denies executing the next step and reports an error.
Step 3: Next, RC proceeds to decrypt CID i to recover
, H (K i SID j ) and ensures that the computed H (K i SID j ) exits in the decrypted values set as expected. If the verification fails, RC aborts the request and returns a failure message; else, RC accomplishes the authentication for S j and U i successively.
Step 4: After that,
ij ) and sends the reply mutual authentication message {D j } to S j .
Step 5: S j receives the response message {D j } and recovers (Y , C i , SK ij ) with secret key s j . Subsequently, S j checks the validity of the decrypted Y by Y ? = β ×Q. If it is consistent with the calculated one, S j assures that U i is authentic by means of entrusted agency RC. Subsequently, S j transmits another decrypted value {C i } to U i .
Step 6: When receives {C i } from the target server S j , U i 's portable device retrieves (SK ij , X , Y ) by decode key K i . Afterwards, the portable device calculates H (RID i SID j X Y ) and checks the equality of it and the decrypted SK ij . If SK ij = H (RID i SID j X Y ), U i confirms the access authorization and the legitimacy of S j is ensured. Then, U i computes F i = H (SID j SK ij X Y ) and sends the response message {F i } to S j for session key negotiation.
Step 7: S j computes F * i = H (SID j SK ij X Y ) and checks whether F * i = F i or not after receiving the reply message. If they are equal. S j notarizes that U i is authorized accessing user and negotiates a session key SK = H (SK ij A i SID j N i D i N j ).
E. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
Step 1: U i invokes the password update module and follows the prompts to key ID i , PW i for confirming validation locally.
Step 2: The portable device computes (PW i r) ) and checks B i ? = H (K i ). If they are unequal, it prompts that the typed username and password do not match and re-imports them. As a security measure, the password update module will be locked if U i enter the wrong username and password three times continuously.
Step 3: U i is requested to input a new password twice. If the input passwords are consistent, The portable device computes
r)) and stores it into its memory to replace A i . On the contrary, it reports typographical errors and asks U i to re-enter a new password twice again.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. AUTHENTICATION PROOF BASED ON BAN-LOGIC
In the previous section, we employed the three-party authentication mode to construct the multiple servers authentication protocol. Herein, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme is reasoned as secure by the formal proof method BAN-logic [6] for tripartite authentication protocol.
The notations and their implications are defined as follows.
1) P |≡ X : The entity P confirms that X is real and believable. 2) (X ): X be recognized as a fresh value which is never sent before. 3) P ⇒ X : Each entity believes that the entity P has jurisdiction to generate the statement X . 4) P X : The entity P receives message X and is permitted to handle it. 5) P |∼ X : The entity P transmitted message X previously. 6) (X , Y ): This message includes formulas X and Y . 7) X Y : This message is produced with the formula X combined with secret Y .
8) {X } Y :
This represents that X is encrypted with the secret key Y . 9) P K ←→ Q: Entities P and Q shares a secret key K which is unrevealed for any untrustworthy one.
10) P
K Q: Entities P and Q possess the identical secret K for affirming their credibility. K is also known to entities trusted by both of them. Next, we present some logical postulates which are crucial for the validation of BAN-logic.
1) The message-meaning rule:
2) The freshness-conjuncatenation rule:
3) The nonce-verification rule:
4) The jurisdiction rule:
P|≡Q|∼X . In the following, we set out the authentication goals for our proposed scheme which intends to share a mutually agreed session key.
1) Goal 1:
The idealized message sequences corresponded with real multiple servers authentication protocol are detailed as follows. 1) Message m 1 :
For validating our scheme, we list the following assumptions which are apparent and necessary.
Assumption a 1 :
From the above assumptions and the idealized message sequences of our protocol, we could proceed to demonstrate that U i and S j share a mutually agreed session key eventually. RC receives m 2 , then we can prove:
From the jurisdiction rule, we can prove:
According to the assumption a 3 and the message-meaning rule, we can prove:
S j receives the message m 3 , we can prove:
According to the assumption a 2 and the message-meaning rule, we can prove:
According to the assumption a 5 and the freshnessconjuncatenation rule, we can prove:
, SK ij ) and the nonce-verification rule, we can prove:
According to the assumption a 6 and the jurisdiction rule, we can prove:
U i receives message m 4 , we can prove:
According to the assumption a 1 and the message-meaning rule, we can prove:
According to the assumption a 4 and the freshnessconjuncatenation rule, we can prove: Y ) ) and the nonce-verification rule, we can prove:
According to the assumption a 8 and the jurisdiction rule, we can prove:
Due to the session key SK = α × Y = α × β × P and the assumption a 9 , we can prove:
S j receives the message m 5 , we can prove:
From the obtained conclusion S j |≡ (U i SK ij S j ) and message-meaning rule, we can prove:
From the obtained conclusion S j |≡ U i |∼ (SID j , X , Y ) and the nonce-verific-ation rule, we can prove:
According to the assumption a 10 and the jurisdiction rule, we can prove:
From the conclusion S j |≡ U i |∼ (SID j , X , Y ) and the jurisdiction rule, we can prove:
Due to the session key SK = β × X = α × β × P and the assumption a 7 , we can prove:
B. DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE ATTACKS
In this section, we present the informal security analysis to show that our proposed scheme is equipped to preserve beneficial functionality and security properties, and also to resist a range of known network attacks.
1) PRESERVING USER PRIVACY
Unlike Jangirala et al.'s proposal, we replace the real username with a blind one RID i as the login element, which is encapsulated in CID i with H (α × Q). Only RC can compute X = x × X with the primary secret key x and retrieve it by decrypting
The approach for the adversary to acquire RID i is infeasible, because it is extremely difficult for him/her to manage the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (computing X = α×Q from X = α×P, Q = x×P). On the other hand, there exists no invariable value in the login request message {CID i , X }, which are both invoked by random number α. Thereby, the adversary can not identify and trace the user who participate in the login session. And hence, the proposed scheme achieves user anonymity and untraceability protection.
2) OFF-LINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
Many research papers have demonstrated that portable devices can be breached by a logical or physical approach [3] , [4] . Herein, the adversary is endowed with the ability that compromises the credential stored in the portable devices. If he/she extracts {A i , B i , r} from the victim user U i 's portable device, where B i = H (A i ⊕ H (ID i H (PW i r) )), the adversary tries to crack the invoked password. From the equation we can see, U i 's username ID i and password PW i are the key values to establish the verification. It means that the adversary has to seek out the matched ID i and PW i simultaneously. The infeasibility of guessing two parameters correctly synchronously in polynomial time shows that our scheme could resist this attack with portable device breach.
3) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
The impersonation attack is an attack launched by the adversary for masquerading validated users and illegitimately accessing information services. The prerequisite for performing the attack is to forge a login request {CID i , X } which can successfully be verified by S j and RC, where
. U i 's blind username RID i and the matched secret key K i are the core for generating the login request. In the above analysis, we have demonstrated that our proposed scheme can achieve username and password confidentiality, and thus the safeguarded K i by these two values is also secure. Thereby, the impersonation attack is infeasible in the proposed scheme.
4) SERVER SPOOFING ATTACK AND REGISTRATION CENTER SPOOFING ATTACK
In the server spoofing attack, if a legal but malicious user of the system tries masquerade as the legitimate service providing server S j , he/she needs to forge a valid reply message {C i } to U i . However, since the adversary cannot recover it from D j without the knowledge of s j , he/she also can not generate it without knowing secret values of U i . If the attacker is a legal but malicious server of the system, he/she also cannot masquerade as another server to deceive any legal user due to he/she cannot obtain the secret keys of other servers to generate the correct response message. Hence, server spoofing attack is meaningless in our scheme.
In the registration center spoofing attack, any participant of the system cannot get the master secret key x, which is held privately by the registration center only. Therefore, any attacker cannot masquerade as the registration center. 
5) REPLAY ATTACK
Replay attacks can be prevented by tagging each message with a session varied component number. In our scheme, the transmitted messages are all contained with a random nonce. Even if the adversary replays any authentication messages exchanged between U i , S j , RC, the receivers can easily detect the replayed one in the verification phase.
6) FORWARD SECRECY
The forward secrecy is an outstanding property of information exchange protocol, which means that compromise of long-term keys does not reveal past session key. In our scheme, U i and S j agree the session key SK = α × β × P with random numbers {α, β} generated by user and server, separately. These two values are only accessible for user and server, and anyone has to computes SK from X = α × P, Y = β × P. In other words, the secrecy of session key is reduced to the intractability of computation Diffie-Hellman problem. Consequently, the leakage of primary secret key x of RC does not compromise the current session key.
7) KNOWN KEY ATTACK
The known key attack is an attack model that adversaries utilize one leaked session key to compromise prior sessions. In our scheme, the session key SK = α×β×P is computed by two session varied random nonces α and β. The calculation method guarantees that each session key SK is independent of the other one. Therefore, the leakage of SK does not affect other unexposed sessions.
VI. PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTIONALITY ANALYSIS
In this segment, we summarize the evaluation of computation overhead and security functionality, and make comparisons with other related solutions [15] , [27] - [29] . It is visible from Table 2 that our scheme can thwart a range of security threats which the other schemes suffers from and provide stronger security and better usability than the other schemes. In addition, we also provide the formal proof of BAN-logic to reason that our proposed scheme achieves tripartite authentication.
In Fig 5 and Fig 6, we illustrate the comparisons of computational consumption in the client-side and server & registration center, respectively. As shown in Fig 5 and Amin et al.'s scheme [29] . Especially, these two schemes are susceptible to some malicious attacks listed in Table 2 .
The simulation of server & registration center is implemented at Python 3.5.2 using an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU @ 3.30GHZ with 3300MB RAM in Ubuntu 16.04 system. We simulate portable device & smart card of users at Python 3.5.2 using an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU at 1.65GHZ with 1540MB RAM in Ubuntu 16.04 system. We employ SHA-256, advanced encryption standard (AES) to implement hash function, symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm. Furthermore, the modular exponentiation algorithm and point multiplication operation is executed in the multiplication cycle group with 1024-bit security parameter and MNT asymmetric group (MNT224), separately.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we identified several vulnerabilities in Jangirala et al.'s authentication scheme for multiple servers authentication architecture. All registered users and servers share a common secret value H (y) and it is the fatal issue that results in the aforementioned security flaws. Hence, we proposed an enhanced scheme with a tripartite certification strategy. Noticeably, user's secret key overhead in our scheme is O (1) and it is more applicable in the wireless mobile environment. Besides, we present the formal proof to analyze the proposed scheme by employing BAN-logic. It is better to reduce the security of the scheme to some mathematical problems which are believed hard in a standard model or random oracle model. How to devise a secure multiple servers authentication and key agreement protocol in the standard model or random oracle model is an interesting topic for our future work. 
